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Love them or hate them; social networking sites are here to stay. And your users are going to find ways to use them from home, from work, from smart phones, from shared computers, or from anywhere else they care to.
The whipped cream is out of the can. Now what can we do about it?
So, how secure are these sites?
I’ve experienced several classic Web security issues in each of the sites I frequent, and without a doubt there remain many vulnerabilities to be discovered. But that hasn’t stopped me from using them.
Like any decision involving risk, I’ve studied the issues, minimized my own exposure, and I’m getting on with what I care to do.
Let’s start by looking at the issues briefly.
Web apps:
Well, for starters, they are Web applications, and as such they’re potentially vulnerable to a plethora of issues, from the OWASP Top-10 and beyond – and yes, there are far more than 10. And don’t think for a moment that all web application vulnerabilities solely place the application at risk. Many also put the app’s users at risk: cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), and others can be used to attack the users quite easily.
As a user of a social networking site, you’re placing your (and your employer’s) data at risk.
Active content:
Long-time readers of this column (hi Mom!) have heard me talk about the dangers of active content many times. Javascript, Java applets, Flash, ActiveX, and many others are all examples of active content. And guess what? Every popular social networking site in existence – or at least with a significant population of users – absolutely requires active content in order for the site to function.
The bottom line: by allowing active content into your browser, you are trusting someone else’s code to run on your computer safely. Well, what’s the big deal? We do that all the time. Well, now the code is dynamic and maintained somewhere else, and you’re trusting it every time. Gulp!
Domain of trust:
Some of the HTML, Javascript, etc., that arrives in your browser comes from (say) Facebook. Fair enough, if you’re going to use Facebook, you’ll need to trust that content. But your browser isn’t so discerning. Some of the stuff that comes into it while you’re on Facebook might be provided by someone else: another Facebook user; an attacker; a third party application on Facebook. If your browser trusts Facebook, chances are it’s also going to trust that code. This extends the active content exposure pretty substantially.
User-supplied content:
Users put all sorts of content into their own profiles. URLs pointing to cool sites, photos, etc. If they link to something dangerous—perhaps inadvertently—and you click on it… Well, you get the drift.
Third party applications:
Most of the popular social networking sites have a third-party application interface for companies to generate their own content. Most of it is pretty innocuous and in the spirit of good clean fun, like a little app that lets you “throw” a virtual snowball at someone else. But, again, it extends that trust boundary in ways you might not want.
